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PROPHECY WITHOUT MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE
Alexander R. Pruss
While it might seem prima facie plausible that divine foreknowledge is all that 
is needed for prophecy, this seems incorrect. To issue a prophecy, God has 
to know not just how someone will act, but how someone would act were 
the prophecy issued. This makes some think that Middle Knowledge is re-
quired. I argue that Thomas Flint’s two Middle Knowledge based accounts 
of prophecy are unsatisfactory, but one of them can be repaired. However 
the resources needed for repair also yield a sketch of a foreknowledge-only 
account of prophecy.
1. Introduction
Middle Knowledge, I will take it, is the doctrine that God non-trivially 
knows the truth values of all subjunctive conditionals of free will (“F-
conditionals”) of the form: 
(1) Were x to be in circumstances C, then x would freely choose to do A 
in C,
where C specifi es the circumstances, in maximum detail but not includ-
ing what the decision is, in such a way that x’s being in C does not en-
tail that x freely chooses to do A and does not entail that she does not so 
freely choose. Note that I am only interested in the case of actual persons x, 
though usually the doctrine is extended to the case of non-actual persons. 
The “non-trivially” in my statement of the doctrine rules out the view 
oﬀ ered by Robert M. Adams1 that all propositions of the form (1) are false, 
in which case it does not take Middle Knowledge to know the truth val-
ues. Specifi cally, the “non-triviality” constraint, I take it, specifi es that 
whenever x, C and A are as above, then either (1) holds or:
(2) x is in circumstances C □→ x would not freely choose to do A in C,
holds, where I will henceforth use □→ to indicate subjunctive conditionals.
The doctrine of Middle Knowledge would follow from the Subjunctive 
Conditional Law of Excluded Middle (SCLEM), that for all p and q we have 
p □→ q or p □→ ~ q.2 However, SCLEM is false. It is neither the case that were 
the moon made out of French cheese, it would be made of Brie, nor is it the 
case that were the moon made out of French cheese, it would not be made 
of Brie. There is a long debate about whether it makes sense to assert (1) in 
counterfactual circumstances C—it seems, on the face of it, that one cannot 
talk truthfully of contingent outcomes of non-actual choices, since then one 
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is talking of what is not. However, Middle Knowledge has been argued for 
on the basis of the att ractive theological consequences. Middle Knowledge 
was introduced by Molina to give an elegant solution to the problem of free 
will and the eﬃ  cacy of grace. If God knows who would freely accept an 
instance of grace, then he can give this grace only to those who would ac-
cept it, thereby guaranteeing that this grace is always eﬃ  cacious, without 
overriding anyone’s free will. This is not, of course, the only solution to that 
problem. There are also Scriptural accounts that on the face of it appear to 
require Middle Knowledge, though this has been disputed.3
Finally, Middle Knowledge appears needed for an account of prophe-
cies about the future. While it is a tautology that simple foreknowledge of 
what will happen is all that would be needed for God to know the future, 
it seems that God’s telling human beings about future occurrences depen-
dent on human free will requires Middle Knowledge. It is this claim that 
I shall discuss. First, I will discuss why it seems that foreknowledge is not 
enough. Second, I will discuss an argument Thomas Flint gives against the 
usefulness of Middle Knowledge in cases of prophecy, as well as Thomas 
Flint’s two variant solutions. The argument, I believe, is correct. The solu-
tions fail as given, though one of them may be fi xed by positing necessarily 
true “relevant similarity” principles. I will then argue that given enough 
such principles, prophecy is possible even without Middle Knowledge.
The “relevant similarity” principles are necessary truths of the form:
(3) If (1) holds, and C* is relevantly similar to C, then it is also the case 
that were x to be in C*, she would also freely choose to do A in C
The opponent of Middle Knowledge can believe that by simple foreknowl-
edge God knows the truth value of (1) in cases where the person satisfying 
S exists and really fi nds herself in C. Given that and a “relevant similarity” 
principle, God can also know some counterfactual claims about what the 
person would do in non-actual circumstances C*. And this can be enough 
for prophecy. At the same time, we shall see that weaker “relevant sim-
ilarity” principles are needed for an account of prophecy given Middle 
Knowledge. Thus, I will argue that while the Middle Knowledge account 
of prophecy has an easier time of it, a simple foreknowledge account, while 
requiring that more “relevant similarity” principles be true, is still pos-
sible, at least as long as prophecy is the only issue under consideration.
2. Why Foreknowledge Is Not Enough
Consider a concrete case within Christianity. Jesus said to Peter: “Truly, I 
say to you, this very night, before the cock crows, you will deny me three 
times” (Matt hew 26:34, RSV). Let us assume, plausibly, that the denials 
are essentially free acts.4 Can we not account for this by simple foreknowl-
edge? Jesus foreknows that Peter will deny him three times. And so he 
says this to Peter. This seems simple and unproblematic, assuming fore-
knowledge is unproblematic.
For simplicity, I will confl ate God’s speaking to Peter and Jesus’s speak-
ing to Peter. A more complex story involving hypostatic union may need 
to be told, but nothing of relevance to my argument hangs on this. Now, 
consider God’s deliberation about what to say to Peter. The thing about 
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deliberation in general is that it requires not just simple knowledge about 
the future, but counterfactual knowledge about what would transpire were 
a given choice made. 
To decide whether to swallow an aspirin while having a headache, I 
need to have some idea of what likely would happen were I to swallow 
the aspirin. The case of the aspirin is particularly obvious because simple 
knowledge that my headache will go away is in fact useless for my delib-
eration, since it gives me no incentive to take the aspirin rather than not 
to take it. And were I to have more thorough knowledge, such as that my 
headache will go away because I will have taken the aspirin, then not only 
this knowledge would not help me make a free decision but, it seems, 
would undercut the very possibility of my making a free decision. What I 
need to know is that were I to take the aspirin, (likely) the headache would 
go away, and were I not to take it, (likely) it would not. 
Thus, as a general principle, it seems that deliberation requires for 
action-guidance that one have appropriate subjunctive conditional beliefs 
about the future, and categorical knowledge of the future consequent on 
the decision appears to undercut the possibility of deliberation. The latt er 
claim is theologically problematic in that it would seem to render impos-
sible God’s deliberating about anything if he knows everything about the 
future. The response to this has to be that God is in eﬀ ect bracketing this 
categorical knowledge when making the decision or that God’s knowl-
edge of the future is posterior in the order of explanation, but not in the 
temporal order, to the decision about what future to actualize. Given this 
modifi cation, we get the claim that deliberation requires subjunctive con-
ditional beliefs about the future, and deliberation is undercut when based 
on categorical knowledge of those parts of the future that are consequent 
on the decision.
However cases of prophecy may be thought diﬀ erent. Suppose that in-
stead of deciding whether to take an aspirin, I need to decide whether to 
say: “My headache will soon go away.” It seems that to make this decision, 
all I need to know is that my headache will in fact soon go away, as well as 
unproblematic nomic counterfactuals about the connection between my 
speaking and your hearing, etc. 
Unfortunately, this does not generalize to the prophecy case. Presum-
ably, if I believe that my headache will soon go away, my having the belief 
is not dependent on any future event. I have the belief, most likely, based 
on inductive data about the past. But in the case of prophecy, assuming 
libertarian free will, God cannot know with complete certainty what will 
transpire based on inductive data about the past. Yet, suppose for a mo-
ment that that is how he knew what would happen. He would still need to 
know a subjunctive conditional claim: He would need to know what Peter 
would do were God to tell him that he would deny God. When making an 
inductive inference, one needs to include all the relevant circumstances in 
one’s consideration, and surely that God told Peter that Peter would deny 
God is relevant. 
Now go back to the non-inductive case. God needs, I will assume, com-
plete certainty when issuing prophecies. Scripture is clear on the complete 
reliability of God. I will assume that it also will not do to suppose that 
God is 99 percent sure that Peter will freely deny him, and in the unlikely 
436 Faith and Philosophy
1 percent case, God is committ ed to forcing Peter (or allowing a non-free 
devil to force him) to non-freely deny God. That seems, at least prima facie, 
contrary to divine goodness, and besides, as Flint argued, the notion of 
a non-free denial seems contradictory. Thus, God’s belief that Peter will 
deny him must be responsive to Peter’s choice. What explains why God 
believes that Peter will deny him is God’s omniscience together with Pe-
ter’s actual future denial. In other words, Peter’s denial is explanatorily 
prior to God’s belief. But God’s belief is explanatorily prior to God’s deci-
sion to speak to Peter. And God’s speaking to Peter is explanatorily prior 
to Peter’s decision, it seems, since it is a part of what formed the character 
that Peter had while making the decision. This means that we have a vi-
cious circularity in the order of explanation.
Hence, mere reliance on foreknowledge would require a vicious cir-
cularity in the order of explanation. Now, while it has been alleged that 
a circularity is present in divine decisions based on Middle Knowledge,5 
and I fi nd the allegation persuasive in most cases (see Section 6.2), I will 
assume for the sake of the argument that the allegation fails.6 Given Mid-
dle Knowledge, we have seemingly a neat account. God knows that Peter 
would deny him if Peter were told that he will. It is a problem to see how 
God knows this, but if we dispute that he knows this, then we are disput-
ing all of the Middle Knowledge account. Given this, God can honestly 
decide to tell Peter that Peter will deny him. And then Peter makes his free 
choice, and indeed denies Christ.
3. A Problem for the Middle Knowledge Account
As Thomas Flint notes, however, we now have a problem. Let C be the 
complete circumstances of Peter’s choice. These circumstances include the 
claim that God told Peter that Peter will deny Christ in these very cir-
cumstances, though they do not (we may suppose) include specifi c claims 
saying what God believes about the future or about F-conditionals. On the 
Middle Knowledge account, God knows:
(4) Peter is in C □→ Peter denies Christ.
However, not only is (4) true, but it is also true that:
(5) Peter is in C ➾ Peter denies Christ,
where the double arrow indicates entailment. For that Peter is in C entails 
that God tells Peter that Peter will deny Christ. And that God tells Peter 
that Peter will deny Christ entails that Peter will deny Christ, because, nec-
essarily, God always says the truth.
But likewise, then, God knows all kinds of other claims, such as:
(6) Andrew is in C1 □→ Andrew denies Christ,
where C1 includes God’s having told Andrew that Andrew will deny 
Christ, or:
(7) Peter is in C2 □→ Peter does not deny Christ,
where C2 includes God’s having told Peter that Peter will not deny Christ. 
For in each of these cases the corresponding entailment holds, and the 
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entailment implies the necessary truth of a subjunctive conditional. But 
God’s Middle Knowledge covers contingent, not necessary, truths. Hence, 
fi rst of all, it seems that it is not by Middle Knowledge that God knows (4). 
Secondly, the fact that (4) is true is of no help to God when God is making 
up his mind what to say, because (7) is equally true, and is of no help to 
God when deciding whom to speak to, because (6) is also true.
In fact, not only is Middle Knowledge not needed for knowing (4), 
but foreknowledge is not needed, either. Divine knowledge is in fact not 
needed: everyone who knows that God essentially has the property of 
speaking only the truth is in a position to know (4). However, if anything 
is clear, it is that prophecy requires at least foreknowledge. Thus, to claim 
that what God has to know to honestly tell Peter what Peter will do is (4) 
is to misidentify the knowledge behind prophecy.
Consider an analogous case. Suppose a Scripture writer is writing in 
the way described by Second Vatican Council:
In composing the sacred books, God chose men and while employed 
by Him they made use of their powers and abilities, so that with Him 
acting in them and through them, they, as true authors, consigned 
to writing everything and only those things which He wanted. (Dei 
Verbum7 11)
This is a plausible account of divine inspiration, one that coheres well with 
the humanness of the style of Scripture. Let us suppose this account is true 
in the case of at least one writer of Scripture, for concreteness let us say 
Paul, and suppose further that in this case the writer is aware that he is 
writing under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit (cf. 1 Cor. 7:10 as opposed 
to verses 12 and 25). Since this is just for illustration purposes, it is not 
necessary for the combination of acting as true author and knowing about 
inspiration to have actually occurred. 
Now suppose that Paul is refl ecting on Christ’s sayings and on the 
Law and trying to fi gure out whether to pen a prohibition of divorce for 
Christians. It occurs to him: “I am writing under inspiration, and I know 
that were I to write under inspiration that divorce is wrong, then divorce 
would be wrong.” But he cannot be guided by this proposition, since it is 
equally true that were Paul to write under inspiration that divorce is accept-
able, then it would be the case that divorce would be acceptable. Instead, 
Paul has to fi gure out whether divorce is wrong on the merits of the ques-
tion. Paul, of course, came to the conclusion that divorce is wrong, for vari-
ous reasons such as that Christ would never divorce the Church. In doing 
so he came to know that were he to write under inspiration that divorce is 
wrong, then divorce would be wrong. But he came to know that this is so 
for a statable reason distinct from the triviality of the conditional.
What we need to identify, then, in cases of prophecy is what the reason 
distinct from the triviality of the condition (4) is. One would like to say 
something like:
(8) God knows that (4) is true not just because it is necessarily true.
Such locutions do make sense in some cases. Thus, I know that 
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(9) Fermat’s Last Theorem holds or Napoleon was vanquished at 
Waterloo
is true not merely because it is necessarily true. However, in this case I can 
specify another proposition that is contingently true in virtue of which 
(9) is also true, namely the proposition that Napoleon was vanquished at 
Waterloo. And without having identifi ed such a proposition, I have not 
said enough about (8) to fi gure out whether Middle Knowledge is or is not 
required in cases of prophecy.
One might try to baldly stick to (8). This, however, is philosophically 
unsatisfactory: it leaves the crucial questions unanswered. More promis-
ingly, one might expand (8) by saying that God knows (4) by his faculty of 
Middle Knowledge in addition to knowing it by inferring it from (5), and 
leave the distinction at that. However, this requires a real distinction be-
tween faculties in God in a way that does not seem compatible with di-
vine simplicity. Moreover, proceeding in this way opens one up to the 
circularity criticisms of Adams.8 Finally, this still leaves quite opaque the 
question of what additional information is available beyond the logically 
necessary claims. 
Before going on to solutions, something should be said about why the 
highly plausible claim that knowledge of (4) is suﬃ  cient to guide God’s 
prophetic action no matt er whether the knowledge came from foreknowl-
edge, middle knowledge or just God’s knowledge of his own infallibility 
is false. It is false precisely because the right hand side of (4) reports an es-
sentially free action: I am assuming that something only counts as a denial 
if it is free. (Otherwise, just modify the consequent to say “freely denies.”) 
Now not just any conditional of the form p □→ x will freely do A is action-
guiding in the sense that God could, on the basis of that conditional and 
some value judgments, decide to directly bring it about that p. 
For instance, consider the conditional that were Peter to freely deny 
Christ, he would freely deny someone who loved him, a conditional God 
knows to be true. Even if God saw a value in the state of aﬀ airs that he 
would thereby know would eventuate were he to bring the antecedent 
about, he could not do so, because by bringing it about that Peter denies 
Christ, he would be ensuring that Peter does not do so freely. In general, 
it seems that in a case where p □→ x will freely do A holds, additional con-
straints are needed in order to ensure that it be possible to use this coun-
terfactual in an action-guiding way. And one plausible constraint is that 
the knowledge of this counterfactual has to depend on some bit of relevant 
foreknowledge or Middle Knowledge, or else the holding of p has to caus-
ally depend, at least in part, on x’s doing A. The simple account based on 
God’s knowledge (5) does not satisfy this desideratum. And neither do the 
two variants of Flint’s solutions.
4. Flint’s First Variant Solution
4.1. The Solution
The fi rst variant of the solution of Flint’s that I am interested in is as fol-
lows.9 Let C* be a reduced set of circumstances, which includes all the data 
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in C other than that God tells Peter that Peter will deny Christ. Then, God 
can guide his decision whether to prophesy on the basis of the following 
F-conditional:
(10) Peter is in C* □→ Peter will deny Christ.
Now observe fi rst that, as Flint notes, God does not know (10) solely 
on the basis of his Middle Knowledge, since the circumstances C* are not 
maximally specifi c the way the circumstances C are. One might think this 
is not a big deal: perhaps we should just drop the maximal specifi city re-
quirement. But as it happens I can give an argument for that requirement.
For suppose we say instead that God knows in all possible circumstanc-
es, described specifi cally or not, what any created agent would do. Let C1 
be the circumstances of my being placed very hungry on the moon, with 
the moon being made of French cheese and no other food being available. 
Then, if Middle Knowledge is not restricted at all, God knows whether it 
is the case that were I in C1, I would freely eat Brie or whether were I in C1, 
I would not freely eat Brie. But to know that just is to know a fact equally 
dubious as the fact whether the moon would be made of Brie were it made 
of French cheese. Indeed, if we think, as we probably should, that there 
is no fact of the matt er about the latt er question, then we should likewise 
think that there is no fact about the former.
However, Flint notes that there is an indirect route to (10). Suppose that 
God knows:
(11) (Peter is in C* and God did not tell Peter that Peter will deny Christ) 
□→ Peter denies Christ
and
(12) (Peter is in C* and God did tell Peter that Peter will deny Christ) ➾ 
Peter denies Christ.
The fi rst of these claims is a bona fi de F-conditional with maximally specifi c 
antecedent. Thus, God can know it by Middle Knowledge. The second of 
these is just our old friend (5). Together these two claims entail (10) by the 
very plausible principle of counterfactual reasoning that if p □→ q and r ➾ 
q, then (p or r) □→ q.
Now, God can guide his decision whether to speak or not by his knowl-
edge of (10). And this knowledge does depend on Middle Knowledge. 
This account does have a disadvantage. It means that if (11) is not true, 
then God cannot tell Peter that Peter will deny him. Thus it seems that 
something is limiting God’s powers of prophecy. But since the limits seem 
to be ones derived from logical considerations, this should not worry one 
unduly. For full disclosure, I should note that the problem will appear in 
stronger form on my preferred account.
4.2. The Action Should Be in the Antecedent of Action-guiding Subjunctives
There is, however, a more serious problem with this proposal. I will ex-
pose this problem in fi ve interrelated parts. First, note that to guide my 
actions, I need to rely on knowledge of counterfactuals of the form were I 
to do A, B would result. My actions are not guided by the mere knowledge 
of a subjunctive of the form were p to hold, B would result, where p is a 
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proposition compatible with the claim that I do A, for exactly the same 
reason as that my actions are not guided by mere knowledge of what 
actually will happen. In fact, a categorical claim about the future is just a 
special case of a subjunctive of the form were p to hold, B would result in the 
case where p is a tautology. 
But the subjunctive guiding God’s action on the present proposal is (10). 
However, an action-guiding subjunctive should include the proposed ac-
tion in the antecedent, and (10) does not.
4.3. No Additional Reason for Accepting (4)
Recall the intuition what is needed is that God should know (4) for a 
reason other than his knowledge of the necessary truth (5). The present 
proposal does not satisfy this intuition because it does not give God an 
additional reason for accepting (4). For, fi rst of all, the reasoning for (10) 
itself depended crucially on (5). Secondly, it is fallacious to derive (4) from 
(10) alone. For a counterfactual with a stronger antecedent may be false 
while one with a weaker antecedent is true. For instance, the following 
two counterfactuals can be both true:
(13) Fred is oﬀ ered a bribe in C1 □→ the bribe is not accepted in C1
(14) Fred accepts a bribe in C1 □→ the bribe is accepted in C1
even though the antecedent of (14) entails that of (13). In fact, the only way 
I can think of to derive (4) from (10) is to make use of (5).
4.4. First Parallel
Consider an analogy in the case of inspiration. Suppose that I know I am 
divinely inspired and would like to issue a prediction of some sort. I am de-
bating whether I should issue a prediction that next week I will have a ter-
rible illness on the basis of prima facie ambiguous messages I have received 
from God. But one thing I do know clearly. I know if I claim to prophesy 
without divine inspiration, God will punish me for it in some appropriate 
way. And what bett er way to punish me for predicting a terrible illness for 
myself than by ensuring I get that illness. Thus, I become convinced that:
(15) Without inspiration I claim to prophesy that I will have a terrible 
illness □→ I will have a terrible illness.
I also know:
(16) With inspiration I claim to prophesy that I will have a terrible ill-
ness ➾ I will have a terrible illness.
These two things entail:
(17) I claim to prophesy that I will have a terrible illness □→ I will have 
a terrible illness.
Could I reasonably use this as an action-guiding subjunctive in decid-
ing whether to prophesy the illness or not? I think not. For nowhere in 
my reasoning did I depend on any special knowledge of the future. I only 
depended here on a belief in (15) based on general considerations and the 
necessary truth (16). Insofar as (17) is analogous to (10), and (17) is not by 
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itself suﬃ  cient to give an action-guiding reason for prophesying, neither 
is (10).
4.5. Second Parallel
Next, observe another parallel situation. Let C** be the circumstances that 
are further reduced not only by omitt ing the claim that God told Peter that 
Peter would deny him, but also by omitt ing information on whether Peter 
was aware of his moral frailty when making the decision whether to deny 
Christ or not. If (10) is suﬃ  cient to guide God’s action, surely so is:
(18) Peter is in C** □→ Peter will deny Christ.
In both cases the set of circumstances is not maximally specifi c, of course. 
But now observe that in fact (18) is not suﬃ  cient to guide God’s action, 
even when combined with and not just derived from:
(19) (Peter is in C** and God did not tell Peter that Peter will deny Christ) 
□→ Peter denies Christ
and
(20) (Peter is in C** and God did tell Peter that Peter will deny Christ) ➾ 
Peter denies Christ.
To see this, note that (18)–(20) are compossible with the conjunction of the 
following claims:
(21) (Peter is in C** and God did not tell Peter that Peter will deny Christ) 
□→ Peter is not aware of his frailty.
(22) (Peter is in C** and God did tell Peter that Peter will deny Christ) 
□→ Peter is aware of his frailty.
(23) (Peter is in C** and God did not tell Peter that Peter will deny Christ 
and Peter is not aware of his frailty) □→ Peter denies Christ.
(24) (Peter is in C** and God did not tell Peter that Peter will deny Christ 
and Peter is aware of his frailty) □→ Peter does not deny Christ.
But (18)–(24) do not give information suﬃ  cient in an action-guiding way 
to justify God in telling Peter that he will deny Christ, assuming of course 
that God cannot tell a falsehood. For all the contingent information in favor 
of God telling Peter this is contained in (19). But in light of (21), (23) and 
(24), it is clear that the reason Peter would deny Christ in C** without the 
prophecy has something to do with his lack of awareness of his frailty, i.e., 
it has something to do with his pride, and so this information does not 
do anything to support the claim that Peter would deny Christ in circum-
stances where he would be aware of his frailty, and if God were to give him 
the prophecy, this would be precisely one of these circumstances.
Now, it might be objected that although (18) is insuﬃ  cient to guide 
God’s action, (10) is. Now it is not clear why (10) is supposed to be suf-
fi cient. If one thinks it is suﬃ  cient because in general to justify a prophesy 
all that is needed is knowledge of a subjunctive conditional of the form x is 
in C1 □→ x does A, perhaps ruling out tautologous circumstances and hav-
ing some relevancy condition on the circumstances, where C1 are circum-
stances that in fact will obtain, then by exactly the same reasoning (18) is 
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suﬃ  cient. If one thinks that (10) is suﬃ  cient because it gives God a reason 
to accept (4) that does not depend on (5), then I suspect any argument to 
that eﬀ ect will apply just as well, or just as badly, in the case of (18).
4.6. The Smile and the Unsure Prophet
As noted on multiple occasions in the above discussion, the fact that, nec-
essarily, were God to tell Peter that Peter will deny him then Peter would deny 
him is useless vis-à-vis guiding God’s prophetic actions. All my objections 
to Flint’s fi rst solution can be seen as diﬀ erent ways of stating that the so-
lution implicitly and illicitly gives an action-guiding role to (5).
To see this perhaps most clearly, consider a fi nal parallel situation. 
Christ has a strong, but not overwhelming, desire to:
(25) smile kindly to Peter if and only if Peter will in fact deny him. 
Perhaps the smile would not be the most appropriate thing under the 
circumstances in the Garden of Gethsemani, except that Christ wants 
Peter to remember the kind smile aft er the denial, in order that he be 
moved to repentance. Suppose that in fact, because of his knowledge of 
the future, Christ smiles to Peter. Now, let C1 the circumstances of Pe-
ter’s choice minus the fact of Christ’s smile and, of course, not including 
Christ’s knowledge of what Peter will do. Then, the following parallel to 
(12) is no longer true:
(26) (Peter is in C1 and Christ smiled kindly to Peter) ➾ Peter denies 
Christ.
Christ’s smiling does not entail that Peter would deny him, and I assume 
that C1 does not contain any additional information to make for this entail-
ment. However, the claim parallel to (11) can in fact be true:
(27) (Peter is in C1 and Christ did not smile kindly to Peter) □→ Peter 
denies Christ.
It is quite clear that, so far, insuﬃ  cient information has been given for 
Christ to make a decision on the basis of a desire to perform (25), i.e., to 
smile if and only if Peter will deny him. The claim (27) may give a weak 
consideration in favor of the decision, but the consideration will be quite 
weak indeed. 
There seems to have to be an additional contingent fact about the situa-
tion that Christ needs to know, namely a fact of how Christ’s smile would 
aﬀ ect Peter’s decision. Christ has to know whether it is true that:
(28) (Peter is in C1 and Christ smiled kindly to Peter) □→ Peter denies 
Christ.
And for exactly the same reasons that an additional contingent fact 
would need to be known over and beyond (27) for Christ to make on fi rm 
grounds the decision whether to smile, so too an additional contingent 
fact would need to be known over and beyond (11). Since (12) is not a 
contingent fact, Flint’s account does not give God enough information to 
make his decision.
In Section 6, I will argue, however, that such an additional fact need 
not be contingent. It just cannot be the purely logical fact about God’s 
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inerrance that grounds (12). And this is the crux here. For (12) is a purely 
logical fact that does not give us any further information about how Peter 
would choose. This is the real problem with (12), and not just its necessity.
The value of parallel case of the smile was that (26) did not hold. We can 
also get a similar sort of argument while remaining within the scope of 
prophecy, by weakening the assumption of omniscience to infallibility (a 
being is omniscient in a context if it knows everything; she is epistemically 
infallible in a context if all her beliefs in that context are true, without it 
being claimed either that the beliefs are knowledge or that they are com-
plete). Suppose that Andrew was given the gift  of prophetic infallibility, 
and moreover that it was revealed to him that
(29) (Peter is in C2 and Andrew does not tell him he will betray Christ) 
□→ Peter denies Christ.
We may add, for completeness, that Andrew also knows that:
(30) (Peter is in C2 and Andrew does not infallibly tell him he will betray 
Christ) □→ Peter denies Christ.
However, let us suppose, Andrew does not know whether it is true that:
(31) (Peter is in C2 and Andrew tells him he will betray Christ) □→ Peter 
denies Christ.
Moreover, Andrew does not know that he is infallible. It is clear that as 
long as Andrew only knows (29) and (30), he is missing a substantive piece 
of information that would be necessary to justify with absolute certainty 
a choice to tell Peter that Peter will deny Christ: he needs knowledge of 
something like (31). 
Suppose now that in addition to knowing (29) and (30), Andrew learns 
that he is infallible, i.e., that whatever he will say about the case will in fact 
be true. Surely this should not help him make up his mind what to say, 
though of course once he says it, it will be clear to him that it was right. 
Knowing that Andrew is infallible does not give Andrew any substantial 
information about Peter. But if Flint’s analysis of how an action-guiding 
reason for prophecy can be obtained is correct, then as soon as Andrew 
learns that he is infallible, he is in a position to conclude that:
(32) Peter is in C2 □→ Peter denies Christ,
since Andrew knows (30) and also knows the tautology that if he were 
to infallibly tell Peter that Peter would betray Christ, then Peter indeed 
would betray Christ. And so, according to Flint, Andrew then has an abso-
lutely certain truth-oriented reason to tell Peter that Peter will deny Christ. 
But surely just learning that he is himself infallible did not by itself give 
Andrew any relevant information here.
5. Flint’s Second Variant Solution
5.1. Harmony
Consider the circumstances C† which are obtained by taking the impover-
ished circumstances C* which do not include God’s having told Peter that 
Peter will betray him, and adding the fact that Peter believes that God told 
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him that Peter will betray him. Now Flint thinks that it may, but need not, 
be the case that the reason why it happens that Peter has this belief B does 
not aﬀ ect how Peter would act. Consider counterfactuals such as:
(33) (Peter is in C† and Peter has belief B because of a demonic infl uence) 
□→ Peter denies Christ
and
(34) (Peter is in C† and Peter has belief B because of a neural malfunc-
tion) □→ Peter denies Christ.
Indeed consider all such counterfactuals where the consequent is that Pe-
ter denies Christ and the antecedent between them diﬀ ers only in how 
Peter came to have the belief, though ensuring that no antecedent is such 
as to entail the consequent. Say that matt ers are “harmonious” provided 
all such counterfactuals have the same truth value. Flint thinks that it is a 
contingent matt er whether there is such harmony. But there may well be 
such harmony.
Now if there is such harmony and God has Middle Knowledge, God 
knows that there is such harmony. Suppose, further, that God knows that 
the harmony is such that all the counterfactuals are in fact true. God can 
then add to this knowledge the claim:
(35) (Peter is in C† and Peter has belief B because God told him it is so) 
➾ Peter denies Christ.
But (35) together with the conjunction of all the harmonious counterfactu-
als above, combined with an appropriate inference principle for subjunc-
tives, yields:
(36) Peter is in C† □→ Peter denies Christ.
And God can use this for guiding his action.
This solution, Flint notes, will only work if God is fortunate enough that 
there is such harmony between counterfactuals. There may well be such 
harmony, and God can simply refrain from prophesying in cases where 
there isn’t. One might note that the three great monotheistic religions tend 
not to posit very many cases of precise future-directed prophecy of free 
actions qua free actions,10 and so the limitedness of application is not a 
serious problem.
5.2. Problems
Unfortunately all of the problems I pointed out that plague Flint’s fi rst so-
lution reappear in modifi ed form. The problem with the fi rst solution was 
that the part of divine knowledge that depended on information about 
what will or would happen was irrelevant on its own for God’s deliberation 
about what to prophesy, while that part which seemed to provide an appro-
priate action-guiding subjunctive was necessarily true. The same still holds 
here. When God knows the harmony claim, which is a substantive contin-
gent claim on this account that requires Middle Knowledge, he knows by 
Middle Knowledge that all the subjunctives like (33) and (34) are true, with 
the crucial exception of the case where the source of the belief B is divine 
testimony. But it is what happens in this crucial case that is relevant.
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The objection from Section 4 that I think makes this clearest is the fi nal 
one. Suppose Christ were deciding whether to smile to Peter, again based 
on a desire to smile if and only if Peter will deny him. And suppose Christ 
knew the corresponding harmony thesis, namely that all the propositions 
of the form:
(37) (Peter is in C† and Peter because of C has the belief that Christ smiled 
to him) □→ Peter denies Christ
have the same truth value where C ranges over all possible sources of 
that belief, with the exception of the cases where the belief comes from 
the smile, and assume Christ knew that the common truth value was true. 
While knowing this would provide Christ with strong evidence that were 
he to smile to him, Peter would still deny him, nonetheless this strong 
evidence is not an entailment on Flint’s view. There is a piece of contingent 
information that is missing, namely what the truth value is of:
(38) (Peter is in C† and Peter because of Christ’s smiling to him has the 
belief that Christ smiled to him) □→ Peter denies Christ.
This is a substantive piece of data that, on Flint’s view, requires Middle 
Knowledge. 
Thus, knowledge of the harmony thesis and of the truth value of the har-
monizing propositions is not enough in the smile case—something more 
has to be known via Middle Knowledge or foreknowledge or something 
like that. But intuitively the same thing is true in the case of prophecy. The 
harmonizing propositions do not give God another conclusive reason to 
accept (4) independent of the non-action-guiding entailment (5).
6. A Solution to the Puzzle
6.1. Relevant Similarity between Circumstances
Flint’s second solution does, however, have a certain plausibility. This 
plausibility comes from the fact that we fi nd the harmony thesis deep-
ly plausible in practice. Consider the following dialogue, which we can 
imagine as taken from a bad movie:
Fred: You should not have drunk that coﬀ ee in the house of your mor-
tal enemy. It might have been poisoned and you would not have 
tasted the poison in coﬀ ee. You were quite foolish.
Bob: But I would not have, or at least might not have, drunk the coﬀ ee 
had it been poisoned.
There is an obvious problem with Bob’s response in that even if the 
counterfactual he states were true, his choice to drink the coﬀ ee would not 
have been rational. But intuitively, there is a further problem. We would 
actually deny both the stronger “would not have” and the weaker “might 
not have” claim. In fact, we think that in this story it is true that had the 
coﬀ ee been poisoned, Bob would have died of poisoning. And this de-
pends on our acceptance of the claim that had the coﬀ ee been poisoned, 
Bob would still have drunk it.
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This suggests that we accept the following principle of relevant similar-
ity between circumstances:
(39) If C and C1 are circumstances diﬀ ering in ways invisible to the agent 
x, and both are circumstances where x would act freely, then if x did 
do A in C, then x would have still done A in C1.
Or, more generally:
(40) If C and C1 are circumstances diﬀ ering in ways invisible to the agent 
x and are such that x would freely act in C as well as in C1, and if x 
would have done A in C, then x would also have done A in C1.
A diﬀ erence is “invisible” in the relevant sense provided that the agent 
is not only unconscious of it but it also has no impact on the conscious or 
unconscious mental state in which the agent makes the decision. For clar-
ity, let me state that “the mental state in which a decision is made” does 
not include the particular decision itself.
Now, given an appropriate version of such a principle, Peter would 
have done the same thing no matt er how he would have come to have the 
belief in question, as long as this would result in the same subjective state 
at that time. There are some complications here, however, as to whether 
the invisibility of the diﬀ erence is supposed to hold only from the stand-
point of the time of the action or must have always held. In the case at 
hand, we can suppose the latt er. Thus, we are distinguishing a case where 
Christ told Peter that Peter would betray him from a case where Peter had 
hallucinated, in the same way, that Christ said this. And the claim is that 
in both cases Peter would have acted in the same way.
The problem with Flint’s second solution was that the harmony claim 
was tantamount to a claim that all the diﬀ erent particular cases happened 
to have the same truth value. But if they all merely happened to have the 
same truth value, then this would tell us nothing conclusive about the cru-
cial veridical case, as was clear in the case of the smile. However, suppose 
that they did not merely happen to have the same truth value, but had the 
same truth value on account of some general fact about the choice being 
independent of factors outside of Peter’s ken. In that case, the criticisms 
would, it seems, no longer apply. 
Suppose for instance that the principle (40) is a true general principle, 
not true merely by coincidence. Then knowing by Middle Knowledge that 
were Peter to have hallucinated Christ’s smile, Peter would have betrayed 
Christ, would in fact be relevant to knowing that were Peter to have seen 
Christ’s smile, Peter would have betrayed Christ. 
Similarly whatever general facts make (40) true, when combined with 
the contingent facts (33) or (34), they would give another reason for accept-
ing (4), a reason essentially based in part on a contingent matt er of fact and 
not just on (5). 
This is the right kind of a solution. Consider the parallel case in the de-
liberation of a divinely inspired writer. What Paul would be looking for is 
precisely a general principle on the basis of which to conclude that were he 
to write under inspiration that divorce is wrong, then it would be the case 
that divorce is wrong, a principle that implies that the claim would be true 
no matt er what circumstances it had been made in.
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Moreover, I think the initial plausibility of Flint’s second solution 
comes from the fact that the solution can prima facie be read along these 
lines. However, I think the general principle approach is diﬀ erent. For 
principles like (40) are not mere contingent truths, as they would be on 
Flint’s account.
For suppose that they were contingent truths, but nonetheless were 
not mere accidental generalizations. The most familiar case of contingent 
truths that are not accidental generalizations are laws of nature. But it 
does not prima facie seem that (40) is a law of nature: it seems of a very dif-
ferent form from them. 
Moreover, there is an epistemological argument against (40) being a 
contingent claim. If it is such, then our knowledge of it would, surely, 
have to proceed by some inductive procedure or by direct observation. 
But there is no inductive access to (40) and it cannot be directly observed. 
To see that (40) is true in some case, we would need to see that someone 
does A under C and then let time roll back—an incoherent notion itself—
and observe that she would still have done A under C1. Thus we have not 
observed even one inductive instance of (40).
There is one alternative, and this is if we accept something like (40) 
only in cases where the circumstances make the action objectively highly 
probable. In such cases, we may have good inductive evidence that in cir-
cumstances C or any like circumstances, the person does A, and hence a 
fortiori that in such circumstances she does the same thing. However, the 
central libertarian cases I am interested in are, I shall assume, not like that. 
Suppose that Bob was deliberating whether to drink his coﬀ ee. He would 
oﬀ end his host by not drinking it. But maybe the drink would kill him. It 
does not seem to be the case that these circumstances would have to make 
it highly likely that he would drink the coﬀ ee. Nor does our belief that had 
the enemy poisoned the coﬀ ee, Bob would have died seem to depend on 
the claim that Bob was very likely to have drunk the coﬀ ee. It seems only 
to depend on the claim that indeed he did drink it, and that he would not 
have been able to tell the diﬀ erence had it been poisoned.
Thus we accept (40) without having the sorts of grounds that are ap-
propriate for contingent claims. If our belief in (40) is justifi ed, it seems 
that (40) is actually going to have to be a metaphysically necessary truth, 
one accepted on conceptual and not empirical evidence. And I think there 
is much plausibility to this. Nonetheless, what I say below will also work 
if (40) is necessary in a weaker way, say nomically so. All I will need is that 
(40) have an alethic necessity status of some sort.
Note that this account satisfi es the constraint given at the end of Section 
3. For on this account, God’s decision is based on a bit of relevant Middle 
Knowledge. For principle (40) makes the knowledge that Peter would 
have denied Christ were he to non-veridically think Christ predicted this 
denial be relevant. 
6.2. Logical Possibility of Prophesy without Middle Knowledge
We are now in a position to spell out a logically possible case where God 
can tell Peter that Peter will deny him without Middle Knowledge, using 
mere foreknowledge. Suppose that God knows that Peter has a malfunc-
tioning neural system which if God does not intervene will cause Peter to 
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hallucinate Christ’s telling him that he will deny Christ. God now decides 
that Peter will in fact be in state C† (see Section 5), either through the mal-
functioning neural system or through a prophecy. Next—where all the 
sequencing is in the explanatory order, which may not correspond to tem-
poral order—God foreknows that Peter will in fact deny him.
At this point, God knows that Peter will be in the circumstances C† 
either due to a hallucination or due to being given a prophecy. These 
disjunctive circumstances diﬀ er invisibly, if at all, from the circumstances 
of Peter being in C† through being given a prophecy. Therefore by (39), 
God knows:
(41) (Peter is in C† and Peter believes B because God told him so) □→ 
Peter denies Christ.
Moreover, God knows this by a route independent of knowledge of the 
necessary truth (5). God can use this knowledge then to decide to issue 
the prophecy.
This does not involve one in any explanatory loop. In the explanatory 
order we have the following sequence:
(42) God decides that Peter at t1 will be in C† due to receiving a halluci-
natory or real prophecy about denying Christ.
(43) Peter at t1 is in C† due to receiving a hallucinatory or real prophecy 
about denying Christ.
(44) Peter denies Christ at t1.
(45) God knows (43), (44) and the relevant similarity principle (39) to be 
true.
(46) God therefore brings it about that at t0 Peter receives a real proph-
ecy about his denying Christ.
Now it may seem that (46) is, problematically, prior in the order of expla-
nation to (43), since the reason Peter is in the disjunctive state is because 
God has prophecied to him. But one may argue that (43) is not dependent 
on God’s decision to issue the prophecy but only on God’s decision to is-
sue the prophecy or to allow Peter to suﬀ er a hallucination.
It is, of course, crucial here that God’s knowledge of (39) not require 
Middle Knowledge. That is why we need here that (39) be a necessary truth 
or at the very least some kind of a general principle that can be known to 
hold independently of specifi c knowledge of particular instantial cases. 
But this is precisely what was also needed in the Middle Knowledge ac-
count. Thus exactly the same kind of “relevant similarity” principle that 
was plausibly used to rescue the Middle Knowledge account can be used 
to rescue a pure foreknowledge account.
But this account is obviously badly limited. It assumes that Peter was 
going to have a hallucination. This kind of an assumption puts a severe 
limitation on when God can prophecy if God’s righteousness does not al-
low him to produce hallucinations of possibly false prophecies. On this ac-
count God can only issue prophesies in such a way that the issuing of the 
prophesy would produce a state in the agent indiscernible from the state 
PROPHECY WITHOUT MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE 449
that would have occurred had the prophesy not been issued, and rare is it 
that such conditions would be satisfi ed.
Limited as it is, the account does accomplish something. It shows that 
prophecy is logically possible on a foreknowledge-only account. Further-
more, if correct, it shows that the believer in foreknowledge does have 
reason to accept that some F-conditionals are true. For the principle (39) 
lets one move from categorical facts about the future to counterfactual 
claims. And it does so in a way that eludes the three basic criticisms of 
F-conditionals.
First, it escapes the criticism that we have insuﬃ  cient reason to believe 
in F-conditionals. For while we have insuﬃ  cient reason to believe in F-
conditionals in general, we do have reason to believe in some F-conditionals, 
such as those produced by (39). Plantinga has argued, similarly, that some-
one who rejects F-conditionals should still accept that if Curley took a small 
bribe, he would have taken a larger one, and Adams agreed:
What makes [the counterfactual that a particular larger bribe would 
have been accepted], I think, is that its consequent is true and the 
truth of its antecedent would not have prevented, or made less likely, 
the event that makes the consequent true.11
I will discuss these kinds of cases in Sections 6.4–6.5, below. The cases 
mentioned here are also of a similar sort.
Second, this account escapes the truthmaker criticism that there is 
nothing in the actual world in virtue of which the contingently true F-
conditionals are true. For the particular F-conditionals coming from a rel-
evant similarity principle are true in virtue of an indisputably actual fact, 
such as Peter’s actually denying Christ, together with whatever it is that 
makes the general principle (39) necessarily true. It is admitt edly not clear 
what the truthmaker of the latt er will be, but the problem is perhaps not 
greater than that of fi nding what makes other necessity claims true: (39) 
could be a conceptual truth about what counterfactuals mean in the case of 
libertarian free actions. Besides, one might think that it is only contingent 
propositions that need such grounding in the actual world.
Third, this account avoids Adams’s circularity-in-the-order-of-explanation 
objection to God’s using Middle Knowledge in providential decisions. The 
way it escapes it has essentially been described above. However, I leave it 
to the reader to verify that given (39), the Middle Knowledge theorist can 
also avoid this objection in exactly the same way and in the same cases—
but there is no advantage of the Middle Knowledge account then.
6.3. Extending the Account
The general structure of this account of foreknowledge is as follows. We 
start with a “relevant similarity” principle of the form:
(47) If CRC1, and if x does do A in C, then x would have still done A in 
C1.
Here R is a “relevant similarity” relation which is technically an equiva-
lence relation: CRC always holds, CRC1 holds if and only if C1RC holds, 
and if CRC1 and C1RC2 hold, then so does C1RC2. Moreover, our account 
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in the previous section requires the technical condition that if CRC1, then 
(C-or-C1)RC1. 
Given such a relevant similarity principle, if C1 would ensue without 
God’s issuing the prophecy that x would do A, and if God’s issuing of the 
prophecy would result in circumstances C, where C and C1 are relevantly 
similar, then God can use his foreknowledge of x’s doing A together with 
his knowledge of the relevant similarity principle to issue the prophecy 
that x will do A. For, God knows that x will do A and, we may suppose, 
has decided that C-or-C1 will eventuate. From this and (47), God fi nds out 
that were x to be in C, x would do A. This gives God an action-guiding 
substantive reason for thinking that were he to prophesy x’s doing A, the 
prophecy would be true.
Thus, the wider the relevant similarity relation is, the more possibility 
for prophecy God has and the more F-conditionals God knows without 
Middle Knowledge. To account for prophecy given Middle Knowledge, 
we did not escape the need for a relevant similarity principle. However, 
we only needed a very narrow principle, one that would imply that Peter 
would act in the same way whether his perception was veridical or not. 
This gave rise to a very narrow set of cases, one so narrow that it is highly 
implausible that it would even cover the Biblical case if God had only 
foreknowledge and not Middle Knowledge.
But a wider relevant similarity relation is also possible, one that might 
be wide enough to encompass the Biblical case. The principle that invis-
ible diﬀ erences between circumstances do not matt er might be part of a 
wider principle that all that matt ers in the circumstances is the time, the 
character of the agent, the subjective mental state, external causal infl u-
ences on the agent, and maybe the history of previous choices. Let R be the 
relation that holds between a pair of circumstances when all these factors 
are the same between them. 
If (47) holds with this choice of R, then we can account for the Bibli-
cal case of Peter. For observe that in the Biblical account aft er the cock 
crowed, “Peter remembered the saying of Jesus, ‘Before the cock crows, 
you will deny me three times.’ And he went out and wept bitt erly” (Mat-
thew 26:75, RSV). This implies that Peter had forgott en the saying of Jesus 
when he denied Jesus. Thus, it may well be that Peter was making his deci-
sion whether to deny Jesus in circumstances subjectively identical to those 
that he would have been in had Jesus not made the prophecy. It is pos-
sible, too, that Peter’s character and history of previous choices were not 
aﬀ ected by the prophecy. This could be true for purely natural reasons, 
or because God brought it about that the prophecy would not aﬀ ect these 
things, or because God was committ ed to bringing it about that even if he 
did not make the prophecy, the same kinds of changes of character would 
occur (e.g., Peter would become more conscious of his frailty). If so, then 
God could fi rst decide that circumstances would occur that would stand 
in relation R to the circumstances that would occur had Christ made the 
prophecy and Peter forgott en it. Then, God could use foreknowledge of 
Peter’s denial together with (47) to get a substantive action-guiding reason 
for making the prophecy.
There is at least some plausibility to a relevant similarity principle of 
this sort. Of course we must be careful to ensure that the plausibility 
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remains given libertarianism—for, of course, given compatibilism there 
is litt le problem in any of this. But there is some plausibility in think-
ing that if hearing something did not aﬀ ect one’s character, and did not 
change the history of one’s actions (this history might matt er if one has a 
metaphysics on which one’s actions are in some sense a part of oneself), 
and one has now forgott en it, then one would have acted the same way as 
one would have had one not heard it in the fi rst place. To get an intuition 
favorable to this, consider a worry that professors have about whether 
their students do not just forget what they have been taught, and hence 
the teaching does not aﬀ ect the students at all. This worry may be as-
suaged by being told that their teaching changes the students’ character. 
But suppose it did not change the students’ character and the students 
just forgot it. Would there be much reason to think that the student would 
or might act diﬀ erently as a result?
One might, of course, wonder if Peter’s forgett ing was in fact total and 
one might have similar worries with respect to any alleged lack of charac-
ter change. However, God could have committ ed himself to ensuring that 
Peter’s forgett ing was total. One might also think that it is impossible to 
freely choose while knowing how one will choose, and this would give 
independent reason for God to ensure Peter would forget.
6.4. Agency
Observe that the more lax the relation R, the easier it is for cases of proph-
ecy to be possible, but at the same time the harder it is to justify (47). So the 
challenge for coming up with foreknowledge-only possibilities for proph-
ecy on this account is to fi nd relations R that are lax enough to make these 
prophecies possible while yet (47) remains plausible.
Note now that there is an account of agency, grounded in ideas of Thom-
as Aquinas, that makes (47) plausible in the case of a fairly wide range of 
relations R. In fact, (47) may even be a conceptual truth, grounded in the 
way that choices, even libertarian-free choices, depend on reasons. Thomas 
Aquinas thought that we make our choices on the basis of opposed reasons, 
and that the choice is indeterministic when there is no strict domination re-
lation between the reasons for one option and those for another. Here we 
say that one reason dominates another provided that they are reasons of 
the same type, but the fi rst is either stronger than or of the same strength 
as the second. We say that the domination is strict if the reasons are not the 
same. We can then say that a set of reasons in favor of action A dominates 
a set of reasons in favor of action B provided that for each of the reasons 
for B, there is a dominating reason for A, a diﬀ erent one corresponding to 
each of the diﬀ erent reasons for B. The domination is then strict provided 
that at least one of the individual domination relations is strict. 
Given this, we can formulate Thomas’s view by saying that our choices 
are indeterministic when and only when there is no option for which the 
subjective reasons strictly dominate the subjective reasons for each of the 
other options. If there is such a strictly dominating option, we may well 
be free in choosing—this will be the situation of the blessed in the aft erlife 
in respect of the choice whether to love God according to St. Thomas—
but the freedom is not of a libertarian sort. Given this kind of a frame-
work, one on which the reasons for a libertarian-free choice are real but 
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incommensurable reasons, it would be highly plausible to say that when 
a person chose to do A, she did so because of the reasons for A, though of 
course there were reasons for non-A, and had she chosen to do non-A, 
this would have been because of the reasons for non-A.12
Furthermore, something like (47) is arguably implied by Lewis’s se-
mantics for counterfactuals, since a world where one acts on the same 
reason that one acted on in the actual world under relevantly similar cir-
cumstances will surely be closer than one where one acted on a diﬀ erent 
reason—but since Lewis’s semantics have fl aws, this consideration has 
only heuristic value, however.
Now, we may extend the account quite plausibly by positing that if 
one chose to do action A in circumstances C, then were one to have been 
in circumstances that are exactly the same in respect of what subjective 
reasons they present, or that induce stronger reasons in favor of A, one 
would still have done A. This can be thought to follow from the claim 
that one chose on account of the reasons. Thus, the person who took the 
smaller bribe would have taken the larger one had it been oﬀ ered, as long 
as the larger one didn’t oﬀ er additional reasons for rejection (e.g., greater 
jail penalties if one were caught). If the larger bribe did oﬀ er additional 
reasons for rejection, then there might be no fact of the matt er as to how 
the person would have acted. This kind of an account could be used to 
construct a fairly lax relation R that still plausibly supports the necessity 
of (47). In fact, one might get something even more general than (47) 
here, something where the relation is not symmetric, but is more like 
a domination relation, and this might conceivably allow for even more 
cases of prophecy.
Moreover, if we take the giving of reasons for free actions to be explana-
tory, then one might think that considerations about the robustness that 
explanation oft en involves might make (47) quite att ractive, since it shows 
that the explanation in terms of reasons for an action not only works in 
the actual world but in some neighboring worlds. However, att ractiveness 
and truth are not the same. But there is another route from considerations 
of explanation to something like (47).
6.5. Explanatory Relevance
We can now give another argumentative route to a principle like (47), in-
spired by the comments of Adams quoted in Section 6.2, above. Suppose 
that events D and E in fact occurred, with E occurring at t. Assume that 
were D not to have occurred, E might not have occurred, a condition I will 
abbreviate as:
(48) D does not occur ◊→ E does not occur.
Assume, further, that D and E are non-overlapping events. Then, surely, 
D is explanatorily relevant to E, i.e., D enters essentially into some expla-
nation of E, where something enters essentially into an explanation if the 
explanation would be less explanatorily complete without it. That condi-
tion (48) is suﬃ  cient for explanatorily relevance seems to be an analytic 
truth about explanation and counterfactuals, though of course condition 
(48) is not necessary for explanatory relevance—cases of overdetermina-
tion sett le that. 
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We can generalize the above observation by making use of the notion 
of a proposition p being explanatorily relevant to a proposition q given 
circumstances C. This means that p enters essentially into some explana-
tion of q not merely by explaining the occurrence of C: without p, the ex-
planation would be impoverished, and not just because C would become 
more mysterious. A diﬀ erent way to express this condition is to say that 
C does not “screen oﬀ ” all of the explanatory relevance of p for explain-
ing q. Contrapositively, p is explanatorily irrelevant to q given C if C does 
“screen oﬀ ” any explanatory relevance of p for explaining q. For instance, 
on standard Newtonian accounts, if C is the complete state of the universe 
at t1 while p reports an event aft er t1, then any report of an event before t1 
is explanatorily irrelevant for explaining p given C, since it enters into an 
explanation of p only through partly explaining C. Another example of 
explanatory irrelevance is that Fred’s having pulled the trigger is explana-
torily irrelevant to Bob’s having died of a gunshot wound given that the gun 
fi red in such-and-such a direction vis-à-vis Bob. But Fred’s having aimed the 
gun at Bob is explanatorily relevant given that the gun was fi red.
A generalization of the connection stated above between “might” con-
ditionals and explanatory relevance is that if we have a situation where 
D and E are actual disjoint events, with E occurring at t, and the circum-
stances C are also actual, then the condition
(49) (D does not occur and circumstances C do occur) ◊→ E does not 
occur at t
implies that D is explanatorily relevant to E given C.
Suppose we accept this. I shall let A be a description of an action. Then, 
suppose that we have actual circumstances C and an actual event D, and 
that x does A at t. Let C1 be the circumstances of C and D occurring, and 
let C1 be the circumstances of C occurring without D. Assume that D is 
explanatorily irrelevant to x’s doing A at t given C. Then we must have the 
negation of (49) by the above considerations, where E is the event of x’s 
doing A at t. Given the standard duality between “would” and “might” 
conditionals that p □→ q if and only if ~(p ◊→ ~q), this implies:
(50) (D does not occur and circumstances C do occur) □→ x does A at t.
If we use R to denote the relation between circumstances C and C1 that 
holds if the above conditions are satisfi ed, then (47) holds, as long as the 
specifi cation of A includes that it was done at t. 
These observations allow one to construct F-conditionals from categori-
cal facts. Moreover, these observations apply in the case of the larger bribe. 
Suppose Curley took a bribe in the amount of, say, $5,000 and we want to 
argue that he would have taken $10,000. Let C be the actual circumstances 
minus a statement of the exact amount of the bribe but with the specifi ca-
tion that the bribe was at least $5,000. Let D be the event of the bribe not 
being $10,000. Intuitively, then, D is explanatorily irrelevant to Curley’s 
accepting the bribe given C. (It is explanatorily relevant if we are not given 
C, because D, at least formulated in this way, entails that a bribe was of-
fered, and this is plainly relevant.) Thus, we can say that had C occurred 
without D, Curley would still have taken the bribe. In other words, had 
there been a bribe that was $10,000, Curley would have taken it.
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We can now use the above considerations to justify various “relevant 
similarity” principles. Suppose that given a full description of one’s char-
acter and state of mind at t, forgott en past events that did not induce one to 
have acted diﬀ erently in the past (again, this is a sop to those who accept 
a metaphysics on which we have an intimate connection even with our 
past actions) are explanatorily irrelevant to our actions. Then, the above 
considerations entail precisely the kind of “relevant similarity” principle 
that we need to handle the case of Peter.
6.6. Objection: Rolling Back the Clock
Now, admitt edly, an image one sometimes uses to explain libertarianism 
is that if one rolled back the clock and put someone in the very same 
circumstances all over again, then the person might well choose diﬀ er-
ently. Such an image seems incompatible with any principle like (47). If 
so, then the whole approach is wrong—not just this account of how God 
could prophesy in the case of Peter given mere foreknowledge, but also 
our solution to the same problem given Middle Knowledge. However, 
the image is one to be examined carefully. It is incoherent to suppose 
that time is rolled back and something else happens. That would mean that 
A happened at t and then (later?) A did not happen at t. Rather, what 
is meant is that were the person put in qualitatively the same circum-
stances again at a later time, with memory having been reset, she might 
act diﬀ erently. And this claim is logically compatible with (47), as long 
as our relation R is such that CRC1 entails that C and C1 occur at one and 
the same time. 
Of course it may be that there is an intuition behind the redoing-the-
choice image that is incompatible with the intuitions behind cases of (47). 
But at the very least, we do not at present have an argument that libertari-
anism entails the denial of the necessity of any non-trivial version of (47). 
And maybe that is all that we theologically need. Prophecy could be a 
mystery, one whose possibility cannot even be demonstrated,13 but which 
can only be defended from objections. My account is such a defense, a de-
fense independent of the doctrine of Middle Knowledge, and one that will 
stand as long as it has not been proved that there are no relations R that 
make (47) necessary and that are suﬃ  ciently lax to be of use to God in the 
actual cases where God is believed to have issued prophecies.
6.7. Objection: Fragmentation
Here is a variant of an objection Flint makes, and responds to, in the 
Middle Knowledge case. It appears that God’s act of will is deeply frag-
mented. Some parts of the divine willing are prior in the order of explana-
tion to Peter’s choice and some are posterior. I do not know if this is the 
only problem. Nor is it completely clear to me why the fragmentation is 
necessarily a problem. It may seem to threaten divine simplicity, but does 
not in any obvious way do so any more than other distinctions within 
the divine will, say between things willed contingently (e.g., that Adam 
should exist) and things willed necessarily (e.g., that God be loved by 
God, or that the Son should proceed from the Father). In the end, I think 
divine simplicity can be saved from the objection that it is incompatible 
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with such distinctions, but to argue for that would require another, much 
harder paper.
I can, however, indicate how Flint’s response in the Middle Knowledge 
accounts, namely to globalize the divine choice and to think of God as 
simultaneously directly willing everything he is directly willing, would 
give one logically possible account of how the divine act of will could be 
unifi ed. The notion of directly willing is to be distinguished from the indi-
rect way that, say, one who directly wills that p also “wills” any proposi-
tion q entailed by p that would not have held had p not held. The notion of 
directly willing is closely related to the notion of intending as understood 
in the context of the principle of double eﬀ ect.
If the arguments of my paper are sound, God can know these argu-
ments with a single act of understanding, without the need for anything 
contingent to be prior to that knowledge. God can then will various con-
ditional propositions, such as that if Peter denies Christ and the circum-
stances of Peter’s choice are such that prophecy of it be possible, then a 
prophecy of it is made, and he wills these propositions all at once, while 
willing various categorical propositions, say that Adam should exist. This 
means that a part of what God wills are various contingency plans that 
never come oﬀ , such as what is to happen should Peter choose not to 
deny Christ.
It may seem a litt le strange to see how God could will that it be the 
case that if Peter denies Christ under such-and-such circumstances, then 
Christ will have prophecied it, without simultaneously willing that 
Christ prophecy it, which would of course make a part of God’s act of 
will explanatorily posterior to Peter’s choice on the pure foreknowledge 
account. But unless we are occasionalists, we are likely to entertain the 
possibility of God’s engaging in certain kinds of acts of direct condi-
tional willing. For instance, we might think that God directly wills the 
(nomic) conditional that if an object is dropped in such-and-such cir-
cumstances, then it drops, and God also might directly will that the ob-
ject be dropped without us having to conclude with the occasionalists 
that God directly wills that the object drop. (There are problems here 
with regard to God’s concurrence and doctrines of continual creation, 
but these can perhaps be handled when we think of God as concurring 
with events under a description that does not entail that a particular one 
of the events should happen.) 
It may be puzzling that God could will that some conditionals going 
from the future to the past should be true, as in the prophecy case, but we 
should not expect there to be nothing puzzling about prophecy. Note that 
if (and this is by no means obvious) the only way God could directly will 
a conditional and its antecedent without directly willing its consequent 
would be by willing into existence some kind of a casual power (e.g., the 
power for the object to fall upon being dropped), then this account would 
entail backwards causation. But it would be a backwards causation that, 
at least in the cases of prophecy, would not involve any circularity para-
doxes—the careful way the account was set up in Section 6.1 takes care of 
that. If such an account could be spelled out, then God could simultane-
ously directly will all that he directly wills, including both categorical and 
conditional states of aﬀ airs.
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7. Conclusions
Prophecy without Middle Knowledge can be handled by building up from 
simple foreknowledge to a relevant F-conditional via a relevant similarity 
principle. It may not always be obvious that such a principle is available. 
But some relevant similarity principle is needed, it seems, even given Mid-
dle Knowledge. Thus, while things are more complicated without Middle 
Knowledge, the case is neither hopeless nor radically diﬀ erent. An omni-
scient being will be able to see much bett er than we which relevant simi-
larity principles are true and how to ensure their applicability, and will be 
able to decide which prophecies to issue on the basis of this knowledge. 
And there is a sense in which my account of prophecy is simpler than 
the Middle Knowledge account: It may need to posit a stronger relevant 
similarity principle than the Middle Knowledge account, but it does not 
require something of a diﬀ erent kind from what the Middle Knowledge 
account requires, while the latt er requires the existence of a class contin-
gent facts not grounded in anything actually existing, something that the 
simple foreknowledge account has no need of.
The most troublesome case for my account would be if the content of the 
prophecy entered into the subjective reasons for the prophesied free action. 
However, it is not clear that we need to suppose such cases to have occurred. 
And such cases seem problematic in any case since they seem to give rise to 
circularities in the explanatory order if one grants that the prophesied free 
action is explanatorily—but not temporally—prior to the prophesy.14
Georgetown University
NOTES
1. “Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil,” American Philosophical 
Quarterly 14 (1977), 109–117.
2. This argument for Middle Knowledge was made by D. Kowalski, “Re-
visiting Adams’s Middle Knowledge Objection,” presented at the American 
Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting, Minneapolis, 2001.
3. Cf. the discussion in Adams (1977).
4. As Flint observes, some actions, such as denial or sinning, are essen-
tially free. To deny someone (with the moral force that “deny” implies here) 
is to deny that person freely. See Thomas Flint, “Prophecy, Freedom and Mid-
dle Knowledge,” in Our Knowledge of God, ed. K. J. Clark (Dordrecht: Klu-
wer, 1992), pp. 151–65. Substantially the same account is given in Chapter 9 
of Thomas Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account, Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1998.
5. Robert M. Adams, “An Anti-Molinist Argument,” Philosophical Perspec-
tives 5 (1991), pp. 343–53.
6. The most plausible account of its failure, I think, would be to deny 
that the truth-value of the conditional specifying what x would do in C is ex-




PROPHECY WITHOUT MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE 457
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11. Adams (1977), p. 115.
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